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Subject: [A-REV] Dorchester Heights by Thomas W. Clarke - 1898 - Part 6 of 7
Date: Sat, 17 Aug 2002 11:22:17 EDT
Subject: Dorchester Heights by Thomas W. Clarke - Part 6
Source: The New England Magazine. Vol 24. Issue 2.
Published April 1898.
Dorchester Heights
Part 6 of 7
Battle Strategies
p.228
Nobody doubted that the honor and traditions of the
British army required an assault on the Heights. The
Council deliberated on the plan of battle, on the troops
to be employed, on the commander.
They did not consider either capitulation, convention or
evasion. At Charlestown they had attacked in front, when the advice of all
the generals had been to land at
Charlestown Neck and take the works in reverse, penning the rebels in. Here
the problem differed. The works had their rear to the Castle.
Reinforcements must come
to them by the front. The Neck forts could sweep the
road of approach for a short distance. Fort Hill could
bombard the basin which the Neck could not reach. To
press the rebels from the Castle side would take their
their works in reverse, and at the same time leave open
the line of retreat. To attack from the Boston side would combine with the
stopping of retreat (which would
give the rebels the courage of despair), the difficulty of assault in front,
which would appall the British by the memory of Bunker Hill, and it would
expose a flank
to the hostile column of re-inforcement. It was resolved to attack from the
Castle.
p.229
Earl Percy was senior officer of the line. His covering
party had brought off the Concord Expedition with some-
thing of credit. He had shown sense in returning by way
of Charlestown instead of through Brookline. It was due
to him that anyone escaped from that expedition. He had
the confidence of his own brigade and of the grenadiers
and light infantry whom he had saved. Pigot, the only
other officer experienced in this way and enjoying the
confidence bred by success, commanded at Charlestown with his brigade and
could not be spared thence. Percy
could have his own brigade, (Pigot's spare regiment)
for Charlestown could get along with three - and a good
part of the corps d'elite of grenadiers and light infantry, together with
some marines. At this time the
British regiments had ten companies each, one of which
was called grenadiers and one, light infantry. In peace, these companies
were on the right and left of the
line. In war they were detached and all the grenadiers
assembled in a temporary battalion and all the light
infantry in another, each under orders of a field officer detailed by the
commanding general.
These companies were kept strong by transfers from the
line, and were not subject to administrative detail.
They formed a special force not brigaded and devoted simply to war. Napolean
formed a similar body in Oudinot's division. This corps d'elite was drawn
upon
for non-commissioned officers very often, and was always
kept as foot-loose as the state of an army permitted.
They were the "forlorn hope" of every great effort. Howe had about six
hundred men for battle of each title, arranged to two battalions. He had
about six hundred
marines, the flower of the naval forces. Percy's own
augmented brigade of five battalions counted in its forty companies about
twelve hundred men for battle, and
of famous regiments, King's Own Royal Fusileers.
On March 5 Howe gave Percy this brigade and as many more grenadiers, light
infantry and marines, and ordered them to drop down to the Castle in
transports,
to land there, embark in boats and cross the strait
to Dorchester point and Old Harbor bay and take the works in reverse.
The embarcation on transports was made, the landing at the Castle was seen,
the collection of boats was observed. The movement was divined. Washington
was sent for. He road the lines; he addressed the troops;
he called up the memories of the fifth of March; he pointed out the
advantages of the position.
Spencer infused enthusiasm into the Connecticut troops;
Ward and Thomas into those of Massachusetts. Twenty-four hours would decide
the fate of the siege.
"Hold firm, see your advantages, above all, keep at work." In the afternoon
came up an easterly storm, so fast and furious that boats could not live in
the sea, and at half-tide the rollers on the flats were so heavy that a
loaded boat would be sure to be wrecked in crossing them. The storm lasted
nearly two days.
To be continued Part 7 of 7 - The Battle.
Transcribed by Janice Farnsworth
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